We investigate the complexity of CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING/DELETING VOTES (CCAV/CCDV) for r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland α in k-axes and k-candidates partition single-peaked elections. In general, we prove that CCAV and CCDV for most of the voting correspondences mentioned above are NP-hard even when k is a very small constant. Exceptions are CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet and CCAV for r-approval in k-axes single-peaked elections, which we show to be fixed-parameter tractable with respect to k. In addition, we give a polynomialtime algorithm for recognizing 2-axes elections, resolving an open problem. Our work leads to a number of dichotomy results. To establish an NP-hardness result, we also study a property of 3-regular bipartite graphs which may be of independent interest. In particular, we prove that for every 3-regular bipartite graph, there are two linear orders of its vertices such that the two endpoints of every edge are consecutive in at least one of the two orders.
INTRODUCTION
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING VOTES (CCAV) and CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTES (CCDV) are two of the election control problems studied in the pioneering paper by Bartholdi III, Tovey, and Trick [1992] . These two problems model the applications where an election controller aims to make a distinguished candidate a winner by adding or deleting a limited number of voters. Since their seminal work, the complexity of these problems under a lot of prestigious voting correspondences have been studied, and it turned out that many problems are NPhard [Bartholdi III et al. 1992; Faliszewski et al. 2011a; Faliszewski et al. 2009; Lin 2012] . However, when restricted to single-peaked elections, many of them become polynomial-time solvable [Brandt et al. 2015; Faliszewski et al. 2011b] .
Recall that an election is single-peaked if there is an order of the candidates, the so-called axis, such that each voter's preference purely increases, or decreases, or first increases and then decreases along this order. A natural question is that, as preferences of voters are extended from the single-peaked domain to the general domain with respect to a certain concept of nearly single-peakedness, where does the complexity of these problems change? A large body of results have been reported with respect to some nearly single-peaked domains. This paper aims to extend these study by investigating the complexity of the above two problems under several important voting correspondences when restricted to the k-axes and k-candidates partition single-peaked elections (k-axes and k-CP elections for short respectively). Generally speaking, an election is a k-axes election if there are k axes such that every vote is singlepeaked with respect to at least one of the axes. Equivalently, an election is a k-axes election if the votes can be partitioned into k sets each of which induces a single-peaked election. An election is a k-CP election if there is a kpartition (C 1 , . . . , C k ) of the candidates such that the subelection restricted to each C i is single-peaked. Clearly, 1-axis elections and 1-CP elections are exactly single-peaked elections. The voting correspondences studied in this paper include r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and Copeland α , where α is a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Additionally, we also resolve an open question regarding the complexity of recognizing 2-axes elections by deriving a polynomial-time algorithm.
is a k -CP election for some k ≤ k [Erdélyi et al. 2017] . However, there are no general relation between k-axes elections and k-CP elections, and between k-axes elections and elections with single-peaked width k [Erdélyi et al. 2017 ].
In addition to CCAV and CCDV, many other problems restricted to single-peaked or nearly single-peaked domains have been extensively and intensively studied in the literature in the last decade (see, e.g., [Betzler et al. 2013; Cornaz et al. 2012; Cornaz et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2013] for WINNER DETERMINATION, [Walsh 2007] for POSSIBLE/NECESSARY WINNER DETERMINATION, [Yang 2015b ] for MANIPULATION, [Menon and Larson 2016] for BRIBERY, and [Faliszewski et al. 2014; Yang 2017a] for some other important strategic voting problems). Approval-Based multiwinner voting problems restricted to analogs of single-peaked domains have also been investigated from the complexity perspective very recently [Elkind and Lackner 2015; Liu and Guo 2016; Peters 2018] .
Finally, we point out that a parallel line of research on the complexity of single-crossing and nearly single-crossing domains has advanced immensely too (see, e.g., [Magiera and Faliszewski 2017; Skowron et al. 2015] ).
We also refer to the book chapters [Elkind et al. 2017; Hemaspaandra et al. 2016 ] and references therein for important development on these studies.
Our Contributions
Our contributions are summarized as follows. r We study CCAV and CCDV in k-axes and k-CP elections under r-approval, Condorcet, Copeland α , and Maximin. r We show that many problems already become NP-hard even when k is a very small constant. However, there are several exceptions. (See Table 1 below for the concrete results.) In addition, our results reveal that from the parameterized complexity point of view, CCAV and CCDV for some voting correspondences behave completely differently. For instance, for r-approval, CCAV in k-axes elections is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to k, but CCDV is already NP-hard even for k = 2, meaning that CCDV restricted to k-axes elections is even para-NP-hard with respect to k. Our results also reveal that when restricted to different domains, the same problem may behave differently. For instance, for Condorcet, we show that both CCAV and CCDV in k-axes elections are FPT with respect to k, but they become para-NP-hard with respect to k when restricted to k-CP elections. Finally, we would like to point out that our study also leads to numerous dichotomy results for CCAV and CCDV with respect to the values of k. r We study the complexity of determining whether an election is a k-axes election. It is known that for k = 1, the problem is polynomial-time solvable [Bartholdi III and Trick 1986; Doignon and Falmagne 1994; Escoffier et al. 2008 ]. Erdélyi, Lackner, and Pfandler [2017] proved that the problem is NP-hard for every k ≥ 3. We complement these results by showing that determining whether an election is a 2-axes election is polynomial-time solvable, filling the last complexity gap of the problem with respect to k.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the notions used in the paper. For a positive integer i, we use [i] = {j ∈ N : 0 < j ≤ i} to denote the set of all positive integers no greater than i.
Election. An election is a tuple E = (C, Π V ), where C is a set of candidates and Π V a multiset of votes, defined as permutations (linear orders) over C. For two candidates c, c ∈ C and a vote π ∈ Π V , we say c is ranked above c or π prefers c to c if π(c) < π(c ). For two subsets X, Y ⊆ C of candidates, a vote with preference X Y means that this vote prefers every x ∈ X to every y ∈ Y . For brevity, we use x y for {x} {y}. Here, π(c) is the position of c in π, i.e., π(c) = |{c ∈ C : π(c ) < π(c)}| + 1. For C ⊆ C and a vote π ∈ Π V , let π(C) = {π(c) | c ∈ C}. In addition, let π C :
to denote the number of votes preferring c to c in E. We drop E from the notation when it is clear from the context which election is considered. For two candidates c and c in C, we
For a linear order ¡ over a set A, we say that two elements in A are consecutive if there are no other elements from A between them in the order.
Voting correspondence.
A voting correspondence ϕ is a function that maps an election E = (C, Π V ) to a non-empty subset ϕ(E) of C. We call the elements in ϕ(E) the winners of E with respect to ϕ. The following voting correspondences are related to our study. Table 1 : A summary of the complexity of CCAV and CCDV in general and nearly single-peaked domains. Here, "P" stands for "polynomial-time solvable". Moreover, "SP" stands for "single-peaked". Our results are in boldface.
All FPT results are with respect to k. Results marked by ♣ are from [Faliszewski et al. 2011b ], by ♦ from [Yang and Guo 2017] , by ♥ from [Lin 2011 ], by ♠ from [Yang 2017b ], by from [Russell 2007 ], by from [Brandt et al. 2015] , by ¶ from [Faliszewski et al. 2009 ], by from [Bartholdi III et al. 1992] , by § from [Faliszewski et al. 2011a ], by £ from [Liu and Zhu 2013] , and by from [Yang and Guo 2014a ].
In the above definition, votes in Π V and Π W are referred to as registered votes and unregistered votes, respectively. For an instance ((C, Π V ), p ∈ C, Π W , ) of CCAV, a subset Π W ⊆ Π W is called a feasible solution of the instance if p uniquely wins (C, Π V ∪ Π W ).
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTES (CCDV)

Input:
An election (C, ΠV ), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and a positive integer .
Question: Is there ΠV ⊆ ΠV such that |ΠV | ≤ and p uniquely wins the election (C, ΠV \ ΠV ) with respect to ϕ?
. An optimal solution of a Yes-instance of CCAV/CCDV refers to as a feasible solution consisting of the minimum votes.
In this paper, we study CCAV and CCDV in k-CP (k-axes) elections. For CCAV, we mean that (C,
For NP-hardness results, we are only interested in the minimum values of k for which CCAV and CCDV in k-CP (k-axes) elections are NP-hard. In fact, one can easily show that, for all voting correspondences considered in this paper, if CCAV and CCDV in k-CP (resp. k-axes) elections are NP-hard, so are they in (k + 1)-CP (resp. (k + 1)-axes) elections. Our NP-hardness results are based on reductions from the following problem.
RESTRICTED EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (RX3C)
Input:
A universe U = {c1, c2, . . . , c3κ} and a collection S = {s1, s2, . . . , s3κ} of 3-subsets of U such that each ci ∈ U occurs in exactly three elements of S.
Question: Is there an S ⊆ S such that |S | = κ and each ci ∈ U appears in exactly one element of S ?
The RX3C problem is NP-hard [Gonzalez 1985] . Parameterized complexity. A parameterized problem instance is a tuple (I, κ), where I denotes the main part and κ is a parameter which is often an integer. A parameterized problem is FPT if any of its instance (I, κ) can be determined in O * (f (κ) · |I| O(1) ) time, where f is a computable function and |I| is the size of the main part. A parameterized problem is para-NP-hard if there is a constant c such that the problem is NP-hard for any parameter greater than c. For more detailed introduction to parameterized complexity, we refer to [Downey and Fellows 1992a; Downey and Fellows 1992b ].
r-APPROVAL
In general elections, CCAV and CCDV for r-approval are NP-hard even when r is a constant (r ≥ 4 for CCAV and r ≥ 3 for CCDV) [Lin 2012 ]. However, when restricted to single-peaked elections, both problems become polynomial-time solvable (even when r is not a constant) [Faliszewski et al. 2011b ]. We complement these results by first showing that CCAV for r-approval in k-axes elections is FPT with respect to k. Our FPT-algorithm is based on the following two observations OBSERVATION 1. If a vote is single-peaked with respect to an axis ¡, then all approved candidates in the vote lie consecutively in ¡.
OBSERVATION 2. For every Yes-instance of the CCAV problem, any optimal solution consists of only unregistered votes approving the distinguished candidate.
The above observations suggest that to solve an instance, we need only to focus on a limited number of candidatesthe candidates at most "r far away" from the distinguished candidate p in the k-axes of the given instance. PROOF. Let C, Π V , Π W , p ∈ C, be the components of the input of a CCAV instance as in the definition, where (C, Π V ∪ Π W ) is a k-axes election. For each c ∈ C, let sc(c) be the score of c with respect to Π V , i.e., sc(c) is the number of votes in Π V approving c. Let Π p be the multiset of all votes π ∈ Π W such that π(p) ≤ r. For each vote π ∈ Π p , let C(π) be the set of candidates ranked in the top-r positions, i.e., C(π) = {c ∈ C | π(c) ≤ r}. Moreover, let B = π∈Πp C(π) \ {p}. Due to Observation 2, any optimal solution consists of only votes from Π p . Moreover, adding a vote in Π p never prevents p from winning. Hence, if the given instance is a Yes-instance, there must be a feasible solution consisting of exactly min{|Π p |, } votes. We reset := min{|Π p |, }, and seek a feasible solution with votes in Π p . Obviously, the final score of p is sc(p)+ . If there is a candidate c ∈ C such that sc(c) ≥ sc(p)+ , the given instance must be a NO-instance. Assume that this is not the case. The question is then whether there are votes in Π p such that for every c ∈ B at most sc(p)+ −sc(c)−1 of the votes approve c. This can be solved in FPT time with respect to |B|. To this end, we give an integer linear programming (ILP) formulation with the number of variables being bounded by a function of |B|. We call a vote π ∈ Π p a β-vote if β = C(π) \ {p}. First, we create for each subset β ⊆ B an integer variable x β which indicates the number of β-votes that are included in the solution. The restrictions are as follows. Let n β be the number of β-votes in in Π p . First, for each variable x β , we require that 0 ≤ x β ≤ n β . Second, the sum of all variables should be , i.e., β⊆B x β = . Third, for each c ∈ B, it must be that sc(c) + c∈β x β ≤ sc(p) + − 1. By the result of Lenstra [1983] , this ILP can be solved in FPT time with respect to |B|. Due to Observation 1, B contains at most k · 2(r − 1) candidates. The theorem follows.
Note that the FPT-algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3.1 does not need any k-axes of the given election. What important is that when the given election is a k-axes single-peaked, the cardinality of the set B is bounded from above by k · 2(r − 1). The framework in the proof does not apply to CCDV for r-approval in k-axes elections. The reason is that any optimal solution of CCDV consists of only votes disapproving the distinguished candidate p. Hence, we cannot only confine ourselves to a limited number of candidates. Now we consider k-CP elections. Yang and Guo [2017] developed a polynomial-time algorithm for CCAV for rapproval in 2-peaked elections. As 2-CP elections are a special case of 2-peaked elections, their polynomial-time algorithm directly applies to CCAV for r-approval in 2-CP elections. However, if k increases just by one, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard even for r = 4. Yang and Guo [2017] also proved that CCAV for r-approval in 3-peaked elections is NP-hard for every r ≥ 4. Their proof is via a reduction from the INDEPENDENT SET ON GRAPHS OF MAXI-MUM DEGREE 3 problem and, more importantly, the election constructed in their proof is not a 3-CP election. We use a completely different reduction to show our result. Particularly, our reduction is from the RX3C problem. The following lemma is easy to see. LEMMA 3.2. Let ¡ be a linear order over C and let C ⊆ C be a subset of candidates that are consecutive in ¡. Then we can construct a linear order π over C such that all candidates in C are ranked above all candidates not in C, and π is single-peaked with respect to ¡. PROOF. Let (U = {c 1 , . . . , c 3κ }, S = {s 1 , . . . , s 3κ }) be an instance of RX3C. We create a CCAV instance with the following components. Consider first r = 4.
Candidates C. We create in total 24κ + 5 candidates. In particular, for each c x ∈ U , we create a set C(c
be the set of all these candidates. Hence, |C 1 | = 4 · 3κ = 12κ. In addition, for each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S, we first create three candidates c x (s), c y (s), and c z (s) corresponding to c x , c y , and c z , respectively, then we create one candidate s . Let C 2 be the set of all these candidates corresponding to all s ∈ S. Hence, |C 2 | = 4 · 3κ = 12κ. Finally, we create a set C 3 of five candidates denoted by p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , and q 4 , respectively. The distinguished candidate is p. We now construct the registered and unregistered votes. For each vote to be created below, we only first specify the approved candidates in the vote, and then we discuss the 2-axes and use Lemma 3.2 to specify the linear preference of the vote.
Registered Votes Π V . First, we create 5κ − 1 votes approving q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , and q 4 . Then, for each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S, we create 5κ−2 votes approving c x (s), c y (s), c z (s), and s . Finally, for each c x ∈ U , there are 5κ−2 votes approving c 1
x , c 2 x , c 3 x , and c 4
x . Unregistered Votes Π W . For each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S, we create four votes as follows:
Finally, we set = 5κ, i.e., we add at most 5κ votes. The above construction clearly takes polynomial time. Now we discuss the preferences of the above votes. Let
. Let ¡ 2 be an order of C 2 such that for every s i , i ∈ [3κ−1], all candidates created for s i are ordered before all candidates created for s i+1 . The relative order over the candidates created for each s i = {c x , c y , c z } can be any liner order such that the candidates c x (s i ), c y (s i ), and c z (s i ) are ranked together. Finally, let ¡ 3 = (p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 ). Clearly, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the approved candidates restricted to C i in each vote lie consecutively on ¡ i . Then, due to Lemma 3.2 we can specify the preferences of the votes in a way so that
. It remains to prove the correctness. (⇒) Assume that S ⊆ S is an exact 3-set cover of U . Consider the election after adding the following 5κ votes: r All 2κ votes π s such that s ∈ S ; r For each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S , all three votes π x s , π y s , and π z s . As S is an exact 3-set cover, for each c ∈ C 2 at most one of the above added votes approves c. As a result, each candidate c ∈ C 2 has final score at most 5κ − 2 + 1 = 5κ − 1. Moreover, for each c i x , i ∈ {1, 2} at most one of the above added votes, corresponding to s ∈ S such that c x ∈ s, approves c i x . As a result, each candidate in C 1 has final score at most 5κ − 2 + 1 = 5κ − 1 too. As all unregistered votes approve p but none of {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 }, the final score of p is 5κ and the final score of each q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 is 5κ − 1. In summary, p becomes the unique winner in the final election.
(⇐) Assume that Π W ⊆ Π W such that |Π W | ≤ = 5κ and p becomes the unique winner after adding all votes in Π W . As all registered votes disapprove p and there are 5κ − 1 registered votes approving q 1 , it must be that |Π W | = 5κ. As each unregistered vote approves p, the final score of p is 5κ. Let Π S = {π s | s ∈ S} and Π be the multiset of the remaining unregistered votes. Then, Π W contains exactly 2κ votes in Π S . The reason is as follows. If Π W contains less than 2κ votes in Π S , then Π W must contain at least 3κ + 1 votes in Π . This implies that there are two votes in Π W ∩ Π which approve a common candidate c 1
x ∈ C 1 for some c x ∈ U , leading c 1 x to have a final score at least 5κ − 2 + 2 = 5κ. This contradicts that p is the unique winner. Moreover, if Π W contains some vote π s ∈ Π S where s = {c x , c y , c z }, then none of π x s , π y s , π z s can be included in Π W , since otherwise due to the construction of the votes, one of c x (s), c y (s), and c z (s) would have a final score at least 5κ, contradicting that p is the unique winner.
. From the fact that each candidate in C 1 ∪ C 2 can be approved by at most one vote in Π W , it follows that S is an exact 3-set cover.
The NP-hardness of CCAV for r-approval for every r ≥ 5 can be obtained from the above reduction by adding some dummy candidates. Precisely, for each c x ∈ U , we make r − 4 copies of c 2
x so that they consecutively lie between c 1
x and c 2 x in ¡ 1 . For each s ∈ S, we make r − 4 copies of s and let them lie consecutively with s in ¡ 2 . In addition, we create a set P of r − 4 candidates which consecutively lie on the left side of p in ¡ 3 . Finally, we create a set Q of r − 4 candidates which consecutively lie on the right side of q 4 in ¡ 3 . Each vote approves the same candidates as defined above together with r − 4 certain dummy candidates, who do not have any chance to become a winner by adding at most votes. Precisely, we have the following registered votes. Now we turn our attention to CCDV. Yang and Guo [2014a] proved that CCDV for r-approval in 2-peaked elections is NP-hard even for r = 3. We strengthen their result by showing that the problem remains NP-hard even when restricted to elections that are both 2-axes single-peaked and 2-CP single-peaked. Our reduction is completely different from theirs. In fact, to establish our result, we resort to a property of 3-regular bipartite graphs which has not been used in the proof of Yang and Guo [2014a] . The 3-regular bipartite graph in our reduction comes from the graphrepresentation of the RX3C problem. In general, this property says that for every 3-regular bipartite graph there are two linear orders over the vertices so that every edge of the graph is between two consecutive vertices in at least one of the two orders. We believe that this property is of independent interest. Recall that 3-regular graphs are those whose vertices are all of degree 3.
LEMMA 3.4. Let G be a 3-regular bipartite graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Then, there are two linear orders ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 over V (G) and a partition (A 1 , A 2 ) of E(G) such that for every i ∈ {1, 2} and for every edge {u, v} ∈ A i , it holds that u and v are consecutive in
The left-hand side is a 3-regular bipartite graph, and the right-hand side showcases two linear orders over the vertices so that each edge is connected by two consecutive vertices in at least one of the orders.
We defer the proof of this lemma to Appendix. Figure ?? is an illustrating example. Now we are ready to unfold the NP-hardness of CCDV for r-approval in 2-axes and 2-CP single-peaked elections.
THEOREM 3.5. For every r ≥ 3, CCDV for r-approval restricted to elections that are both 2-axes single-peaked and 2-CP single-peaked is NP-hard.
PROOF. Let (U = {c 1 , . . . , c 3κ }, S = {s 1 , . . . , s 3κ }) be an instance of RX3C. We create a CCDV instance with the following components as follows. We first consider r = 3 and then we discuss how to extend the reduction for any r > 3.
Candidates C. We create in total 15κ + 5 candidates. In particular, for each c x ∈ U , we create two candidates c 1
x and c 2 x . In addition, we create five candidates denoted by p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , and q 4 , where p is the distinguished candidate. Let
, and c z (s) corresponding to c x , c y , and c z , respectively. Let C 2 be the set of all candidates corresponding to elements in S.
Votes Π V . We only specify here the approved candidates in each created vote, then after the correctness proof we utilize Lemma 3.2 to specify the linear preferences of all votes so that they are both 2-axes single-peaked and 2-CP single-peaked. First, we create one vote approving p, q 1 , q 2 and one vote approving p, q 3 , q 4 . In addition, for each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S, we create four votes as follows: r π s approving c x (s), c y (s), c z (s); r π x s approving c x (s), c 1 x , c 2 x ; r π y s approving c y (s), c 1 y , c 2 y ; and r π z s approving c z (s), c 1 z , c 2 z . It is easy to verify that the winning set is C 1 \ {p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 }. Precisely, every winning candidate has score 3, p has score 2, every q i where i ∈ [4] has score 1, and every candidate in C 2 has score 2. Finally, we set = 7κ, i.e., we delete at most 7κ votes.
The above construction clearly takes polynomial time. In the following, we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒) Assume that S ⊆ S is an exact 3-set cover of U . Consider the election after deleting the following 7κ votes: r All κ votes π s such that s ∈ S ; r For each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S , all three votes π x s , π y s , and π z s . Due to the construction and the fact that S is an exact 3-set cover, p has score 2 and every other candidate has score 1 after deleting these votes, implying that p becomes the unique winner.
(⇐) Assume that Π V is a subset of Π V with minimal cardinality such that |Π V | ≤ = 7κ and p becomes the unique winner after deleting all votes in Π V . Due to the minimality of Π V , no vote in Π V approves p. Hence, p has score 2 after deleting all votes in Π V . Let Π S = {π s | s ∈ S} and Π U = {π x s | s ∈ S, c x ∈ s}. For every π s ∈ Π V ∩ Π S , all three votes π x s , π y s , π z s , where s = {c x , c y , c z }, must be included in Π V , since otherwise one of c x (s), c y (s), and c z (s) would have score 2 after deleting all votes in Π V . Let t = |Π V ∩ Π S |. It follows from the above analysis that |Π V | ≥ t + 3(3κ − t) = 9κ − 2t, implying that t ≥ κ. On the other hand, as there are 6κ candidates in C 1 \ {p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 } and every vote in Π U approves two of these candidates, to decrease their scores to at most 1, we need to delete at least 9κ − 3κ = 6κ votes, i.e., |Π V ∩ Π U | ≥ 6κ. This directly implies that t = κ and |Π V | = 7κ. Let S = {s ∈ S | π s ∈ Π V }. Clearly, |S | = t = κ. Due to the above analysis, for every π s ∈ Π V , none of π x s , π y s , and π z s is in Π V , since otherwise there would be more than 7κ votes in Π V . As a result, if there are two s, s ∈ S which contain a common element c x ∈ U , then c 1 x (and c 2 x ) would have score at least 2 after the deletion of all votes in Π V , contradicting that p is the unique winner. So, the 3-subsets in S must be pairwise disjoint, implying that S is an exact 3-set cover.
, in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Finally, we show that the election constructed above is both a 2-axes election and a 2-CP election. We first how that it is 2-axes single-peaked. To this end, we show that there exist two axes ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 over C such that for every vote constructed above, the approved candidates in the vote are consecutive in at least one of ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 . To this end, we need an auxiliary graph. Note that the RX3C instance (U, S) can be represented by a 3-regular bipartite graph with vertex-partition (U, S). In addition, there is an edge between some c ∈ U and s ∈ S if and only if c ∈ s. Due to Lemma 3.4, there are two linear orders ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 over U ∪ S such that for every edge {c, s} in the graph where c ∈ s ∈ S the two vertices c and s are consecutive in one of these two orders. We first construct a linear order ¡ * 1 (resp. ¡ * 2 ) over C based on ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ). First, we let ¡ * 1 (resp. ¡ * 2 ) be a copy of ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ) and then we do the following modification.
r For each c x ∈ c where x ∈ [3κ], we replace c x with the two candidates c 1 x and c 2 x corresponding to c x in ¡ * 1 (resp. ¡ * 2 ). The relative order between c 1
x and c 2
, we replace s in ¡ * 1 (resp. ¡ * 2 ) with the three candidates c x (s), c y (s), and c z (s) created for the element s. The relative order among these three candidates are determined as follows. If s is not the first element in ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ), let c i , i ∈ [3κ], be the element ordered immediately before s in ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ), i.e., c i and s are consecutive in ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ) and c i ¡ 1 s (resp. c i ¡ 2 s). If i ∈ {x, y, z}, we require that c i (s) is ordered before everyone in {c x (s), c y (s), c z (s)} \ {c i (s)} so that the three candidates c 1 i , c 2 i , and c i (s) are consecutive. Symmetrically, if s is not the last element in ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ), and c j denotes the element ordered immediately after s in ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ) we have the following requirement: if j ∈ {x, y, z}, we require that c j (s) is the last one among c x (s), c y (s), and c z (s), so that the three candidates c 1 i , c 2 i , and c i (s) are consecutive. See Figure 2 for an illustration. We order c x (s), c y (s), and c z (s) so that the above requirements are fulfilled.
Given the final ¡ * 1 and ¡ * 2 , let ¡ 1 = (q 1 , q 2 , p, q 3 , q 4 , ¡ * 1 ) and ¡ 2 = (q 1 , q 2 , p, q 3 , q 4 , ¡ * 2 ). Clearly, the three candidates p, q 1 , and q 2 are consecutive in both ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 , and the three candidates p, q 3 , and q 4 are consecutive in both ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 too. Due to Lemma 3.2, we can complete the linear order of the vote approving exactly p, q 1 , and q 2 (resp. p, q 3 , and q 4 ) so that it is single-peaked with respect to ¡ 1 and, moreover, p, q 1 , and q 2 (resp. p, q 3 , and q 4 ) are the top-3 candidates. Let s ∈ S be a 3-subset in S. In ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 , all the three candidates created for s are consecutive. Let c x ∈ s be an element in s and let us consider the vote π x s whose top-3 candidates are c x (s), c 1
x , and c 2 x . Clearly, {c x , s} is an edge in the above mentioned 3-regular graph. Then, due to Lemma 3.4 , c x and s are consecutive in at least one of the original orders ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 , say, without loss of generality, ¡ 1 . Then due to the definition of ¡ * 1 , the three candidates c 1 x , c 2 x , and c x (s) are consecutive. Therefore, all the three votes created for s can be completed into linear-order votes which are single-peaked with respect at least one of ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 too, and whose top-3 candidates are exactly those that are approved in these votes. This completes the proof that the constructed election is a 2-axes election with ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 being the witness. Now, we show that the above election is also a 2-CP election. To this end, it suffices to show that (C i , Π Ci V ) is singlepeaked for each i ∈ [2]. Let ¡ 1 be an order of C 1 such that for every c x , x ∈ [3κ − 1], the two candidates corresponding to c x are ordered before the two candidates corresponding to c x+1 . Moreover, for each c x ∈ U , c 1
x is ordered before c 2 x . Furthermore, the candidates p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , and q 4 are ordered after all the other candidates in C 1 and they are ordered as (q 1 , q 2 , p, q 3 , q 4 ). Let ¡ 2 be an order of C 2 such that for every s ∈ S, the three candidates corresponding to s are ordered consecutively (the relative orders among them do not matter). Clearly, for each i ∈ [2] the approved candidates restricted to C i in every vote lie consecutively on ¡ i . In this case, we can specify the preferences so that each vote restricted to C i is single-peaked with respect to ¡ i as follows. Let π be a vote. Let A 1 and A 2 be the set of approved candidates in π in C 1 and in C 2 , respectively. Due to Lemma 3.2, we can specify the preference 1 of π restricted to C 1 (resp. C 2 ) so that A 1 (resp. A 2 ) are ranked consecutively above all the other candidates and the preference is single peaked with respect to ¡ 1 (resp. ¡ 2 ). Then, we define the preference os π over the whole set of candidates as
where the preferences among candidates in A 1 , and among candidates in C 1 \ A 1 are specified by 1 , and the preferences among candidates in A 2 , and among candidates in C 2 \ A 2 are specified by 2 . This preference is 2-CP singlepeaked with respect to the partition (C 1 , C 2 ) as its restriction to C 1 and C 2 are exactly 1 and 2 which are singlepeaked with respect to ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 , respectively, as discussed above.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, to extend the above proof to every r ≥ 4, we add a number of dummy candidates. Precisely, we create r − 3 copies of q 1 and r − 3 copies of q 4 so that the copies and their originate are consecutive in the respectively axis. Let A(q 1 ) and A(q 4 ) respectively denote the sets of copies of q 1 and q 4 . For each c x ∈ U , we create r − 3 copies of c 2
x which consecutively lie with c 2 x in the respective linear axis. For each s ∈ S, we create a set A(c) of r − 3 candidates. Regarding the votes, we extend the two votes approving {p, q 1 , q 2 } and {p, q 3 , q 4 } respectively to that approving {p, q 1 , q 2 } ∪ A(q 1 ) and {p, q 3 , q 4 } ∪ A(q 4 ). For each s ∈ S, we create four votes approving respectively the following candidates r c x (s), c y (s), c z (s) and all candidates in A(c); r c x (s), c 1
x , c 2 x and all copies of c 2 x ; r c y (s), c 1 y , c 2 y and all copies of c 2 y ; r c z (s), c 1 z , c 2 z and all copies of c 2 z . The correctness proof if similar.
CONDORCET CONSISTENT VOTING
In this section, we study CCAV and CCDV for several Condorcet consistent voting correspondences, i.e., voting correspondences which select exactly the Condorcet winner whenever it exists. We first show some FPT results for Condorcet. Our results rely on an FPT-algorithm for the MIXED INTEGER PROGRAMMING WITH SIMPLE PIECEWISE LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS problem (MIPWSPLT). This problem is a generalization of integer linear programming (ILP) with the entries of the input matrix being replaced with piecewise linear convex or concave functions. Bredereck et al. [2017] recently proved that MIPWSPLT is FPT with respect to the number of variables. To establish our FPT result, we need only a special case of the MIPWSPLT problem which is defined as follows.
INTEGER PROGRAMMING WITH SIMPLE PIECEWISE LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS (IPWSPLT)
Input:
A collection of s · t piecewise linear concave functions {fi,j : i ∈ [s], j ∈ [t]}, and a vector b ∈ Z s .
Question: Is there a vector x = x1, x2, . . . , xt of t integer variables such that for every i ∈ [s], it holds that t j=1 fi,j(xj) ≤ bi?
where t is the number of variables.
Note that the result in [Bredereck et al. 2017 ] holds for the variant of IPWSPLT where the less than sign is replaced with the greater than sign or the equal sign in (1).
For a vote π over a set C of candidates and a candidate c ∈ C, let Ab(π, c) (resp. Be(π, c)) be the set of all candidates ranked above (resp. below) c in π, i.e., Ab(π, c) = {c ∈ C : π(c ) < π(c)} (resp. Be(π, c) = {c ∈ C : π(c ) > π(c)}). PROOF. We prove the theorem by giving an IPWSPLT formulation for CCDV and CCAV, respectively, with the number of variables being bounded by a function of k.
Let us consider first CCDV. Let ((C, Π V ), p ∈ C, ) be a given CCDV instance where (C, Π V ) is a k-axes election with respect to k-axes ¡ 1 , . . . , ¡ k . We solve the instance as follows. Let Π V1 , . . . , Π V k be a partition of Π V such that for every i ∈ [k], all votes in Π Vi are single-peaked with respect to ¡ i . Observe that for each π ∈ Π Vi , i [k], all candidates ranked above the distinguished candidate p lying consecutively on ¡ i . Moreover, either all of them lie on the left-side of p or all of them lie on the right-side of p on ¡ i . For each Π Vi , i ∈ [k], let Π L Vi (resp. Π R Vi ) be the multiset of all votes in Π Vi where all candidates ranked above p lie on the left-side (resp. right-side) of p in ¡ i . Precisely, for each i ∈ [k],
, p), i.e., the candidates ranked above p in π X (i,x+1) are also ranked above p in π X (i,x) . This implies that there is an optimal solution such that for each i ∈ [k] and X ∈ {L, R} such that t X i > 0, this solution includes either none of Π X Vi , or it includes all votes π X (i,x) such that x ∈ [y] for some positive integer y ≤ t X i and excludes all the other votes in Π X Vi . Based on the observation, we create an instance of IPWSPLT as follows. We create in total 2k variables. In particular, for each axis ¡ i , i ∈ [k], we create two variables denoted by Let (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m ) be any arbitrary but fixed order of C \ {p}, where m is the number of candidates minus one. For each integer i ∈ [k], each X ∈ {L, R}, and every candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, we define a piecewise linear concave function f i,X,c : R ≥0 → R ≥0 as follows. First, f i,X,c (0) = 0. Second, for each positive integer
Finally, for a real number x between integers y and y + 1, we have that
The restrictions are as follows.
r For every i ∈ [k] and every X ∈ {L, R}, we have that x X i ∈ N and 0 ≤ x X i ≤ t X i . r Since we seek a feasible solution of size at most , we have that
r To ensure that p is the Condorcet winner in the final election, for each candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, we have that
In the above inequality, N (c, p) is calculated with respect to Π V . The right side is the number of votes in the final election, and the left side is the double of the number of votes ranking c above p in the final election. This inequality ensures that p beats c in the final election. The above programming can be solved in FPT time with respect to k by the algorithm studied in [Bredereck et al. 2017] (Theorem 2) .
is a k-axes election with respect to k-axes ¡ 1 , ¡ 2 , . . . , ¡ k . The algorithm to solve the instance is similar to the above one for CCDV. Let (Π W1 , . . . , Π W k ) be a partition of Π W such that for every i ∈ [k], all votes in Π Wi are single-peaked with respect to ¡ i . The observation above holds for Π W as well. For each i ∈ [k], let Π L Wi (resp. Π R Wi ) be the multiset of all votes in Π Wi (resp. Π Wi ) where all candidates ranked above p lie on the left-side (right-side) of p in ¡ i . Precisely, for each i ∈ [k],
For each i ∈ k and each X ∈ {L, R}, let t X i = |Π X Wi | and (π X (i,1) , π X (i,2) , . . . , π X (i,t X i ) ) be an order of all votes in Π X Vi such that π X (i,x) (p) ≤ π X (i,y) (p) for all integers x and y such that 1 ≤ x < y ≤ t X i . For each i ∈ [k], we create two variables denoted by x L i and x R i . In particular, x L i (resp. x R i ) indicates how many votes in Π L Wi (Π R Wi ) are included in the solution. We define the same piecewise concave functions as in the above algorithm for CCDV. Now, we describe the restrictions.
r Since we seek a feasible solution of size at most , we have that
In the above inequality, N (c, p) is calculated with respect to Π V . The above programming can be solved in FPT time with respect to k by the algorithm studied in [Bredereck et al. 2017 ] (Theorem 2). Now we consider Condorcet winner in k-CP elections. Yang and Guo [2017] proved that CCAV for Condorcet in 3peaked elections and CCDV for Condorcet in 4-peaked elections are NP-hard. We strengthen their results by showing that CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet are NP-hard in 3-CP elections, a subclass of 3-peaked elections. PROOF. We reduce the RX3C problem to CCAV and CCDV. Let (U = {c 1 , . . . , c 3κ }, S = {s 1 , . . . , s 3κ }) be an RX3C instance. Consider first CCAV. The components of the CCAV instance are as follows.
Candidates C. We create in total 12κ+1 candidates. In particular, for each c x ∈ U , we create one candidate c x . Let
In addition, for each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S, we create three candidates c x (s), c y (s), c z (s) corresponding to c x , c y , c z , respectively. Let C 2 be the set of candidates corresponding to the 3-subsets in S. Finally, we create a distinguished candidate p. Let C 3 = {p}.
Let ¡ 1 = (c 1 , . . . , c 2 ) be the order of C 1 according to the indices of the candidates. Moreover, let ¡ 2 be any arbitrary order of C 2 such that for each s ∈ S the three candidates corresponding to s are ordered consecutively.
Registered Votes Π V . We create in total 5κ − 3 votes, each of which ranks p in the last position. The positions of other candidates in a vote are set in a way so that the vote restricted to C 1 and C 2 is single-peaked with respect to ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 , respectively.
Unregistered Votes Π W . The unregistered votes are created according to S. In particular, for each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S, we create four votes π s , π x s , π y s , and π z s such that: r π s ({c x (s), c y (s), c z (s)}) = {1, 2, 3}, π s (p) = 4; r π x s (c x (s)) = 1, π x s (c x ) = 2, π x s (p) = 3; r π y s (c y (s)) = 1, π y s (c y ) = 2, π y s (p) = 3; and r π z s (c z (s)) = 1, π z s (c z ) = 2, π z s (p) = 3. The exact positions of c x (s), c y (s), c z (s) in π s , and the positions of the remaining candidates in each of the above four votes are set in a way so that the votes restricted to ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 are single-peaked. Let Π S = {π s : s ∈ S} and Π U = {π x s : s ∈ S, c x ∈ s}. Finally, we set = 5κ, i.e., we are allowed to add at most 5κ votes from Π W . The above construction clearly takes polynomial time. It remains to prove the correctness.
(⇒) Assume that S ⊆ S is an exact set cover of U . Consider the election after adding the following 5κ votes:
(1) All 2κ votes π s such that s ∈ S ;
(2) For each s = {c x , c y , c z } ∈ S , all the three votes π x s , π y s , and π z s . Clearly, the final election has in total 10κ − 3 votes. Moreover, for each c ∈ C 2 at most one of the above added 5κ votes ranks c above p. As a result, there are at most (5κ − 3) + 1 = 5κ − 2 votes ranking c above p, implying that p beats every candidate in C 2 in the final election. As S is an exact set cover, for each c x , among the 5κ added votes only the vote π s , corresponding to s ∈ S such that c x ∈ s, ranks c x above p. Analogous to the above analysis, we know that p beats every candidate in C 1 in the final election. In summary, p becomes the Condorcet winner after adding the above 5κ votes.
(⇐) Assume that Π W ⊆ Π W such that |Π W | ≤ = 5κ and p becomes the Condorcet winner after adding all votes in Π W . As p is not the Condorcet winner with respect to the registered vote constructed above, it holds that |Π W | ≥ 1. Then, we can observe that |Π W | = 5κ must hold, since otherwise there is at least one candidate which ranked above p in at least (5κ − 3) + 1 = 5κ − 2 and hence is not beaten by p in the final election. Moreover, Π W contains exactly 2κ votes in Π S . The reason is as follows. If Π W contains less than 2κ in Π S , then Π W contains more than 3κ votes from Π U . This implies that there are two votes in Π W ∩ Π U both of which rank a common candidate c ∈ C 2 above p, leading to c not being beaten by p in the final election. On the other hand, if Π W contains some vote π s ∈ Π S where s = {c x , c y , c z }, then none of π x s , π y s , and π z s can be included in Π W , since otherwise due to the construction of the votes, one of c x (s), c y (s), c z (s) is not beaten by p in the final election. Hence, if Π W contains t votes in Π S , then |Π W | ≤ t + 3(3κ − t) = 9κ − 2t, which is strictly smaller than 5κ if t > 2κ, a contradiction. Let S = {s ∈ S : π s ∈ Π W }. Due to the above analysis, it holds that
Moreover, for each π s where s ∈ S and s = {c x , c y , c z }, all three votes π x s , π y s , π z s are in Π W (otherwise Π W contains less than 5κ votes). As for each candidate c ∈ C 1 there can be at most one vote in Π W ranking c above p, it follows that S is an exact set cover.
Consider now the reduction for CCDV for Condorcet in 3-CP elections. We first create the same candidates as in the above reduction for CCAV, and then we create one more candidate q in C 3 . Hence, we have C 3 = {p, q} now. Let ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 be defined as above. Concerning the votes, we adopt all 12κ votes in Π S constructed above, with the candidate q being ranked immediately above p (hence, if π(p) = t in a vote π in advance, we have now π(q) = t and π(p) = t + 1). In addition, we create a multiset of two votes such that p and q are ranked in the 1st and 2nd positions, respectively. Finally, we create a multiset of 5κ − 1 votes such that p and q are ranked in the second-last and the last positions, respectively. Let Π be the multiset of the above 5κ + 1 votes. The positions of all candidates other than p and q in each of Π are set in a way so that this vote restricted to ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 is single-peaked. In total, we have 17κ + 1 votes. We set = 7κ, i.e., we are allowed to delete at most 7κ votes. Clearly, the construction can be done in polynomial-time. Utilizing similar arguments as in the above proof for the correctness of the reduction for CCAV, we can show that there is an exact set cover of U if and only if the CCDV instance has a solution of size 7κ. Precisely, let S ⊆ S be an exact set cover, then Π V = {π s : s ∈ S } ∪ {π x s : s ∈ S \ S , c x ∈ s} is a solution. One can check that after the deletion of all votes in Π V , for every candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, there are exactly 5κ votes ranking c above p. As there remain 17κ + 1 − 7κ = 10κ + 1 votes in total, p becomes the Condorcet winner. A significant observation for the proof of the other direction is that any optimal solution of the CCDV instance is disjoint with Π, since otherwise q would beat p. Analogous to the above proof for CCAV, we can first show that any solution Π V contains exactly κ votes in Π S and 6κ votes in Π U , where Π U = {π x s : s ∈ S, c x ∈ s}. Then, we can show that S = {s ∈ S : π s ∈ Π V } is an exact set cover of U . Now we discuss CCAV and CCDV for Copeland α , where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and Maximin in k-axes elections for small values of k. In a sharp contrast to the fixed-parameter tractability of CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet in k-axes elections, the same problems for both Copeland α and Maximin are NP-hard even for k = 2. In particular, Yang and Guo [2014b] and Yang [2015a] established reductions from the X3C problem to CCAV and CCDV for Copeland α , 0 ≤ α < 1, in elections with single-peaked width 2. It turned out that the elections constructed in their proofs are 2-axes single-peaked, as shown in the proof of the following theorem. In addition, for CCAV and CCDV for Copeland 1 and Maximin, Yang and Guo [2014b] and Yang [Yang 2015a ] proved they are NP-hard in elections with single-peaked 3, which are again turned out to be 2-axes single-peaked. Nevertheless, for these two rules, we provide new reductions because of the following reasons. First, compared with the reductions in [Yang and Guo 2014b; Yang 2015a] , the new reductions are simpler with less candidates, votes, and types of votes. The simplicity is not purely because that we use a reduction from the restricted version of the X3C problem. In fact, some proofs in [Yang and Guo 2014b; Yang 2015a] heavily rely on the assumption that every element in the universe U occurs in an even number of 3-subsets in the given collection S which is obviously not fulfilled in any RX3C instance. Second, our reductions for CCAV and CCDV are unified reductions in the sense that they apply to both Copeland 1 and Maximin, but in [Yang and Guo 2014b; Yang 2015a] there are separate reductions for Copeland 1 and Maximin.
A general explanation of the complexity difference of Condorcet, Maximin, and Copeland α , 0 ≤ α < 1, is that to make the distinguished candidate p the Condorcet winner, we need only to focus on the comparisons between p and every other candidate. In other words, if two votes rank the same set of candidates above p, they have the same impact on the solution. However, in Copeland α and Maximin this does not hold. PROOF. In this proof, we first show the NP-hardness of CCAV and CCDV for Copeland α , 0 ≤ α < 1, in 2-axes elections. This is done by showing that the elections constructed in the NP-hardness reductions of CCAV and CCDV for Copeland α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, in [Yang 2015a ] (Theorem 3.2) are 2-axes single-peaked. To make the proof as complete as possible, we provide the definitions of the elections but refer the correctness proofs to [Yang 2015a] . After this, we derive reductions for CCAV and CCDV in 2-axes elections which apply to both Copeland 1 and Maximin. All reductions are from the RX3C problem. Let (U = {c 1 , . . . , c 3κ }, S = {s 1 , . . . , s 3κ }) be an instance of the RX3C problem.
CCAV for Copeland α , 0 ≤ α < 1. The constructed election in [Yang and Guo 2014b] is as follows. Candidates C. For each c x ∈ U there are two candidates c L x and c R x . In addition, there are two candidates p and p . The distinguished candidate is p.
Registered Votes Π V . There are κ − 1 registered votes, each of which has the preference
In addition, there is one vote with preference
Unregistered Votes: Π W . The unregistered votes are created according to S: for each s ∈ S, there is one vote π s with preference , p, p , B) . It is fairly easy to check that all registered votes are singlepeaked with respect to ¡ 1 and all unregistered votes are single-peaked with respect to ¡ 2 .
CCDV for Copeland α , 0 ≤ α < 1. The corresponding election given in [Yang 2015a ] is constructed based on an instance of the X3C problem. We replace the X3C instance with an RX3C instance and obtain the following instance. The candidate set is the same as the one for CCAV for Copeland α , where 0 ≤ α < 1. Moreover, let ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 be defined as above.
Votes Π V . First, for each s ∈ S, there is one vote π s with the preference
It is fairly easy to see that the above votes are single-peaked with respect to ¡ 1 . Let Π S = {π s : s ∈ S}. In there are 2κ − 2 votes with the preference
, and two votes with preference
. One can check that the above 2κ votes are single-peaked with respect to ¡ 2 .
We point out that the above reductions do not apply to Copeland 1 and Maximin. In particular, in both reductions, the final score of the distinguished candidate is 6α · κ + 1 and that of every other candidate is α · (6κ + 1) after adding (for CCAV) or deleting (CCDV) the votes in a solution. Therefore, only when 0 ≤ α < 1, the distinguished candidate is the unique winner. For Copeland 1 and Maximin, we derive the following reductions.
CCAV for Copeland 1 and Maximin. We construct the following instance. In this reduction, we assume that κ ≥ 3. Candidates C. We create 9κ + 1 candidates in total. More specifically, for each c x ∈ U we create a set C(c x ) = {c 1
x , c 2 x , c 3 x } of three candidates. In addition, we create a distinguished candidate p. Let C = cx∈U C(c x ) ∪ {p}. Registered Votes Π V . We create in total κ registered votes. Precisely, we first create two votes with the following preference
Then, we create κ − 2 votes, each of which has the preference
Let A 1 = (c 1 1 , c 1 2 , . . . , c 1 3κ ) and A 2 = (c 3 1 , c 2 1 , c 3 2 , c 2 2 , . . . , c 3 3κ , c 2 3κ ). Note that as we assumed κ ≥ 3, κ − 2 is a positive integer. In addition, let ¡ 1 = (A 1 , ← − A 2 , p). It is easy to verify that the above votes are single-peaked with respect to ¡ 1 . Unregistered Votes Π W . We create 3κ unregistered votes based on S. For each s ∈ S, we create a vote π s with the preference p {c 1 1 , c 2 1 , c 3 1 } · · · {c 1 3κ , c 2 3κ , c 3 3κ }. Moreover, for each c x ∈ U we make c 2
1 , c 1 1 , c 3 2 , c 1 2 , . . . , c 3 3κ , c 1 3κ ) and A 4 = (c 2 1 , c 2 2 , . . . , c 2 3κ ). In addition, let ¡ 2 = ( ← − A 3 , p, A 4 ). It is easy to check that all unregistered votes are singlepeaked with respect to ¡ 2 .
(⇐) Assume that there is a Π ⊆ Π V such that |Π| ≤ κ and p becomes the unique Copeland 1 /Maximin winner in E = (C, Π V \ Π). Observe first that it must be that Π ⊆ Π S and |Π| = κ, since otherwise c 2 1 remains as the Condorcet winner. (Recall that in Π S there are 3κ − 3 votes ranking c 2 1 in the top. Assuming κ ≥ 4, c 2 1 remains as the Condorcet winner after deleting at most −1 votes, or deleting at most votes in total with at least one of them from Π ) It follows that p ties all the other candidates and hence is a weak Condorcet winner in E. Because Copeland 1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent, p must be the unique weak Condorcet winner. This means that every candidate except p is beaten by at least one candidate in E. Due to the above construction, for every two distinct c x , c y ∈ U such that 1 ≤ x < y ≤ 3κ, all the 2κ votes in Π rank all candidates in C(c y ) above all candidates in C(c x ), and all the 3κ − = 2κ votes in Π S \ Π rank these candidates the other way around. Therefore, in the election E, all candidates in C(c x ) tie all candidates in C(c y ) for all y = x. Moreover, as all the 2κ votes in Π prefer c 3
x to c 1 x , the only candidate which is able to beat c 3
x in E is c 2 x . This further implies that c 2 x is beaten by c 1 x . As there are exactly 2κ − 1 votes in Π preferring c 1 x to c 2 x , there are at least two votes in Π S \ Π preferring c 1
x to c 2 x . Due to the construction, this means that there is at most one vote π s ∈ Π which prefers c 1
x to c 2 x and c x ∈ s. As this holds for all c x ∈ U and |Π| = κ, the subcollection {s ∈ S : π s ∈ Π} is an exact set cover of U .
Note that the NP-hardness of CCAV and CCDV for Copeland α , 0 ≤ α < 1 in elections with single-peaked width 2, established by Yang and Guo [2014a] , implies the NP-hardness of the same problems in 2-CP elections because any election with single-peaked width k is a k -CP election for some k ≤ k [Erdélyi et al. 2017] .
For Copeland 1 and Maximin in elections with single-peaked width 2, Yang and Guo [2014a] proved that CCAV and CCDV are polynomial-time solvable. Our results stand in contrast to theirs. PROOF. We prove the theorem by reductions from the RX3C problem. Let (U, S) be a given RX3C instance where |U | = |S| = 3κ. Without loss of generality, we assume that κ ≥ 3. Let (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 3κ ) be an arbitrary but fixed order of U . Similar to Theorem 4.4, our proofs are based on that Copeland 1 and Maximin are weak Condorcet consistent.
CCAV for Copeland 1 and Maximin. We create an instance as follows.
x } of four candidates. In addition to these candidates, we create a candidate p which is the distinguished candidate. In total, we have 12κ + 1 candidates.
In the following, we create the votes so that they are 2-CP single-peaked with respect to the following axis. Particularly, let ¡ 1 = (p, c 1 1 , c 3 1 , c 1 2 , c 3 2 , . . . , c 1 3κ , c 3 3κ ) and ¡ 2 = (c 2 1 , c 4 1 , c 2 2 , c 4 2 , . . . , c 1 3κ , c 4 3κ ). Let ¡ = (¡ 1 , ¡ 2 ). Clearly, all created candidates are in the linear order ¡ which is served as the axis.
Registered Votes Π V . First, we create κ + 1 votes with the preference C 3κ C 3κ−1 · · · C 1 p.
Among these votes, we specify the preferences inside all C x , x ∈ [3κ], such that the following requirements are fulfilled (number of votes: preferences) Additionally, we create one vote with the preference p C 1 C 2 · · · C 3κ so that inside each C x , x ∈ [3κ], it holds that c 1
x c 2
x c 3
x c 4
x . The pairwise comparisons among candidates in each C x with respect to the registered votes are shown in Figure 3 . Unregistered Votes Π W . The unregistered votes are created according to S. Particularly, for each s ∈ S, we create one vote π s with the preference p C 1 C 2 · · · C 3κ .
In side each C x where x ∈ [3κ], we set Fig. 3 : The pairwise comparisons among candidates in each C x with respect to the registered votes in the proof of CCAV for Copeland 1 in Theorem 4.5. The number beside an arc from a candidate to another candidate is the number of registered votes ranking the former above the latter. The node with number j inside presents the candidate c j
x . The comparison between c 1 x and c 3 x , and the comparison c 2 x and c 4 x are not given since their comparisons can be easily analyzed base on the single-peakedness in the correctness proof given below. if c x / ∈ c. One can check all the above created votes are single peaked with respect to each of ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 , and hence the election is a 2-CP election.
Finally, we set = κ, i.e., we are allowed to add at most κ unregistered votes. The construction clearly can be done in polynomial time. In the following, we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒) Assume that there is an exact set cover S ⊆ S of U . Consider the new election after adding the κ votes corresponding to S . In the new election, there are exactly 2κ + 2 votes among which κ + 1 have the preference C 3κ · · · C 1 p and κ + 1 votes with the preference p C 1 · · · C 3κ .
Therefore, in the new election, p is a weak Condorcet winner. Due to the above construction of the unregistered votes, we know that inside each C x , x ∈ [3κ], exactly one unregistered vote with the preference c 1 r π x (a) < π x (b) < π x (c), π x (d) < π x (b); and r π y (c) < π y (b) < π y (a), π y (d) < π y (b).
Two votes α-conflict if there are four candidates forming an α-structure with them. The following lemma was studied by Ballester and Haeringer [2011]. LEMMA 5.3 ([BALLESTER AND HAERINGER 2011] ). An election (C, Π V ) is single-peaked if and only if there are no WD-structure and α-structure in (C, Π V ).
We prove the claim as follows. Assume for the sake of contradiction there is a vertex u in L i who has at least two neighbors in the graph H i−1 2 . Recall that all cycles in H 1 are vertex-disjoint, and hence u does not belong to any of L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L i−1 . Due to the above procedure, we know that all edges incident to u in H i−1 2 must be from M 3 . However, if u has at least two neighbors in H i−1 2 , M 3 cannot be a matching, a contradiction. Based on the above claim, we find a desired edge in L i as follows. Let {u, w} be an arbitrary edge in L i . If {u, w} fulfills the condition in Line 3, we are done. Otherwise, due to the above claim, it must be that u and w are the two ends of a path in H i−1 2 . Let w be the other neighbor of w in the cycle L i . Due to the above claim, w has degree 1 in H i−1 2 . This directly means that w cannot be in the same path as u and w. Then, {w, w } is the desired edge which can be removed from L i to H i−1 2 as described in Line 4. Now, let H t 1 and H t 2 be the graphs returned by the above procedure. Then, we can define the desired linear orders ¡ 1 and ¡ 2 based on the fact that both H t 1 and H t 2 consists of only vertex-disjoint paths. Precisely, let (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t ) be an arbitrary but fixed order of all paths in H t 1 . For each P i where 1 ∈ [t], let (P i (1), P i (2), . . . , P i ( )) denote the path P i , i.e., is the number of vertices in the path and there is an edge between P i (j) and P i (j + 1) for all j ∈ [ − 1] in H t 1 . Then, we define ¡ 1 so that all vertices in P i are ordered before all vertices in P i+1 for all i ∈ [t − 1]. Moreover, the relative order of the vertices in each P i in ¡ 1 is exactly (P i (1), P i (2), . . . P i ( )). The linear order ¡ 2 can be constructed analogously.
